Detecting Sponsored Recommendations by Krishnasamy, Subhashini et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
4.
03
71
3v
1 
 [c
s.I
R]
  1
4 A
pr
 20
15
Detecting Sponsored Recommendations
Subhashini Krishnasamy1, Rajat Sen1, Sewoong Oh2, and Sanjay
Shakkottai1
1The University of Texas at Austin
2University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
With a vast number of items, web-pages, and news to choose from, online services
and the customers both benefit tremendously from personalized recommender systems.
Such systems however provide great opportunities for targeted advertisements, by dis-
playing ads alongside genuine recommendations. We consider a biased recommendation
system where such ads are displayed without any tags (disguised as genuine recom-
mendations), rendering them indistinguishable to a single user. We ask whether it is
possible for a small subset of collaborating users to detect such a bias. We propose an
algorithm that can detect such a bias through statistical analysis on the collaborating
users’ feedback. The algorithm requires only binary information indicating whether a
user was satisfied with each of the recommended item or not. This makes the algorithm
widely appealing to real world issues such as identification of search engine bias and
pharmaceutical lobbying. We prove that the proposed algorithm detects the bias with
high probability for a broad class of recommendation systems when sufficient number
of users provide feedback on sufficient number of recommendations. We provide exten-
sive simulations with real data sets and practical recommender systems, which confirm
the trade offs in the theoretical guarantees.
1 Introduction
The growth of online services has provided a vast variety of choices to users. This choice
exists today in multiple domains including e-commerce with a variety of products, and online
entertainment (NetFlix, Pandora). With users having to choose from an overwhelming set of
items, recommender systems have become indispensable in easing the information overload
and search complexity. Recommender systems are not restricted to retail businesses. A
search engine like Google can be viewed as a recommendation engine that helps users find
relevant information by ranking the search results according to their search criteria, history
and other personal information. Social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook display
Tweets and News Feed based on users’ past behavior and their connections to other users.
News portals like Yahoo! News also present personalized content to online news readers.
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Personalized recommender systems serve as an attractive platform for advertisers to reach
their targeted consumers. It is now customary to see ads alongside other genuine recommen-
dations in many of the websites that provide recommendation services. One can distinguish
these ads from genuine recommendations, for example, by the location of their placement
or by their special tags. But recommendation engines are not legally obliged to facilitate
such distinction and could possibly serve these ads mixed with genuine recommendations in
a manner that renders them indistinguishable to users. Such a biased recommender system
can have far reaching consequences, including user dissatisfaction with the recommendations
[1]. A recent survey by Facebook shows that users find sponsored ads mixed with genuine
posts in their News Feed more annoying than the explicit, well-separated ads [2]. Social
and political consequences of bias in the context of media and online content have also been
studied [3, 4, 5].
Modern recommender systems, in general, consist of two components: (i) learn individual
preferences from user feedback, and (ii) recommend items to users based on the estimated
preferences. This combination of learning and recommending is bound to be noisy (the
learning phase will explore individual preferences typically by presenting “random” recom-
mendations), and several recommendations to users will likely be ineffective. Critically, both
noise and bias manifest as bad recommendations to users. However, noise is benign and is
a consequence of learning, while bias is systematic and is to be deprecated. Thus, a basic
question of interest to the users of such systems is whether or not such a biased recommender
system can be detected. This is a broad question, and detecting bias in its most general
sense is out of the scope of this paper. We focus on a detecting a specific type of bias where
recommendation engines systematically favor a few items over other better or at least equally
good items, contrary to what an objective or unbiased system would do.
It should be noted that, with most service providers being non-transparent about their
recommendation strategies, one cannot hope to know the exact statistical profile of the
recommendation engine a priori. Therefore, the key is to identify the primary features that
can be used to differentiate between the two types without any a priori knowledge about the
particulars of the recommendation strategy. One could, for instance, consider the average
rating or the average number of ineffective recommendations as the performance measure and
make a decision based on a threshold parameter. However, as we also demonstrate through
simulations, such a basic algorithm based solely on average performance cannot distinguish
between deliberate systematic bias and innocuous random errors. This brings us to the key
question: Can we develop a better method to expose a biased recommender system?
1.1 Contributions of this paper
We say a recommendation engine is biased, if it systematically favors a small set of items over
other items in the database irrespective of users’ preferences. On the other hand, we say that
a recommendation engine is objective, if it satisfies a simple monotonic property in its rec-
ommendations to users – better suited items are given higher priority (in a statistical sense).
The primary goal of this paper is then to develop algorithms to answer the following ques-
tion: Can a meaningful distinction be drawn between objective and biased recommendation
engines?
BiAD Algorithm: We propose an anomaly detection algorithm that we call Binary feed-
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back Anomaly Detector (BiAD), which uses a statistical approach to identify a biased rec-
ommendation engine. Under appropriate conditions on the size of the ad-pool, the aggres-
siveness of the biased recommender system, and the number of users/samples, we show that
BiAD correctly (with high probability) distinguishes between objective and biased recom-
mendation engines.
The algorithm leverages user collaboration, and is based on the observation that a bi-
ased system is typically characterized by the occurrence of a large number of ineffective
recommendations in a small set of items. On the contrary, giving higher priority to more
effective items, as in an objective recommender system, precludes such concentration in a
small set. Notably, since the users are not aware of the set of items, the BiAD algorithm
is adaptive – as the recommender system learns users, the users “learn” the recommender
system. Further, our algorithm relies only on binary feedback on the effectiveness of the
recommendation. Finally, the BiAD algorithm also works for a large class of recommender
systems since our model does not place any constraints on the recommendation engine other
than mild statistical conditions. We finally present extensive simulation results that cover
various types of recommender systems and data sets to illustrate the wide applicability of
the algorithm.
1.2 Related Work
Following the recent successes of the targeted advertising services, there have been several
empirical studies that investigate the effects of displaying sponsored content alongside organic
content [1, 6, 7]. There have also been attempts to explain such effects through theoretical
models [8, 9]. In addition, several researchers have worked on designing systems and algo-
rithms from the content provider’s perspective for revenue maximization through efficient
auction of the ad-space [10] and from the advertiser’s perspective for effectively reaching
the target audience [11, 12]. It is empirically shown in [1] that customers are less likely to
select recommendations which are tagged as “advertisement” or “sponsored”, motivating the
advertisers to remove such tags.
Prior work on anomaly detection in recommender systems exists from the perspective of
a recommendation engine as a victim of false user-profile injections [13, 14]. To the best of
our knowledge, ours is the first work that considers the problem from the users’ perspective
and proposes a mechanism for detection of bias in recommendation engines.
2 System Model
In this section, we describe our assumptions about the structural properties of objective
and biased recommender systems by the means of a probabilistic model. This model does
not include any particulars about the working of the recommendation engine and therefore
typifies a broad class of recommender systems. Before we proceed to describe the model in
detail, the salient features of this model are listed below:
• An objective recommendation engine has a fairly good estimate of the user preferences.
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• An objective recommendation engine follows the monotonic property – higher prefer-
ence to higher ranked items.
• A biased recommendation engine systematically gives preference to a small set of items
irrespective of users’ tastes.
Notation: Our notation O,Ω,Θ, o, ω to describe the asymptotics of various parameters
with increasing size of the database (total number of items in the database) is according
to the standard Landau notation. We say that an event occurs with high probability if the
probability of the event tends to 1 as the size of the database goes to infinity. We use 1 {·}
to represent the indicator function, i.e.,
1 {E} :=
{
1 if event E occurs,
0 otherwise.
Equality and inequality between random variables always refer to almost sure (with prob-
ability 1) conditions unless otherwise specified. For example, if X and Y are two random
variables, then X = Y implies X = Y a.s. For any given matrix, R, the uth row of R is
represented by Ru.
2.1 User-Item Database
The recommendation engine recommends products to users from a large database ofm items
indexed from 1 to m. A user’s opinion about an item is represented by a numerical value
that we call the user’s rating of that item. It should be noted that these ratings are only
an implicit representation of true opinions of the users – higher the rating, better suited is
the item for the user. We denote the user-item rating matrix for the entire database by R,
where rows indicate users and columns indicate items. We introduce a parameter called the
efficacy threshold, denoted by η which is used to represent opinions on a binary scale. We
assume that a user is satisfied with a recommendation if the rating of the recommended item
is greater than or equal to η. We refer to such a recommendation and item as being effective
for that user.
Definition 1 (Effective & Ineffective). An item i is effective for a user u if the rating of that
item by the user, Rui is at least η. Similarly, a recommendation is said to be effective for a
user if the recommended item is effective. An item or recommendation that is not effective
is said to be ineffective.
Let fu(η, [m]) denote the number of items in the database [m] whose rating is greater
than or equal to η for user u. In other words, it is the number of effective items in the
database for user u.
Let us define the function F : R× Rm → R as follows:
F (r,Ru) := |{i : Rui ≥ r}| ,
where Rui is the i
th element of the m-length vector Ru. This function is used to find the
number of items whose rating exceeds value r for any player u if the ratings of all the items
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in the database for player u is given by Ru. For example, if Ru is the row corresponding to
player u in the rating matrix, R, then F (η,Ru) is equal to fu(η, [m]), the number of effective
items for user u. Similarly, F (Rui,Ru) gives the rank of item i for user u. Also note that for
any given Ru, F (r,Ru) is a non-increasing function of r.
2.2 Recommendation Engine
We next describe the behavior of a recommendation engine using a probabilistic model. Let
1ui(t) indicate whether item i has been recommended to user u at time t, i.e.,
1ui(t) :=
{
1 if item i is recommended to user u at time t,
0 otherwise.
We make the following assumption about any recommender system: An item that has been
recommended to a user once is not recommended to the same user again, i.e., for any user,
u and item, i,
∑∞
t=1 1ui(t) ≤ 1.
2.2.1 Objective Recommendation Engine
An objective recommendation engine is considered to consist of two components - one is
the learning strategy which estimates the user-item rating matrix by the means of available
feedback from users, and another is the recommendation strategy which generates recom-
mendations based on the estimated user preferences. Our model does not specify the details
of the learning strategy except requiring that the output of the strategy, that is the esti-
mate of the user-item matrix, be close to the original rating matrix, R. Therefore, this model
could be applied to a wide class of recommendation engines which estimate users’ preferences
fairly well. Let the estimate of the rating matrix at time t be denoted by Rˆ(t) =
[
Rˆui(t)
]
.
This estimate is modeled as the sum of the original rating matrix and an additive noise
matrix whose elements are independent across users, items and time. This can be written as
Rˆ(t) = R+ ǫ(t), where ǫ(t) = [ǫui(t)] is the noise matrix and ǫui(t) is independent of ǫu′i′(t
′)
for all u, u′, i, i′, t, t′.
The recommendation strategy uses the estimated user-item rating matrix Rˆ(t) to make
recommendations at time t. The following model characterizes the behavior of an objective
recommendation strategy:
1. Recommendations are made based on a user-item weight matrix, denoted by W(t) =
[Wui(t)] . This is a stochastic matrix (rows sum to one), which is updated based on the
current estimate of the rating matrix, Rˆ(t).
2. Given the weight matrix, a user is given a recommendation by choosing an item ran-
domly, independent of everything else, with weights given by the row corresponding to
the user in the user-item weight matrix.
3. At any time t, the weight matrix W(t) satisfies the following monotonic property: if i
and j are two items that have not been shown to user u and the ratings are such that
Rˆui(t) ≥ Rˆuj(t), then the weights satisfy Wui(t) ≥ Wuj(t).
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2.2.2 Biased Recommendation Engine
A biased recommendation engine marks a small set of items, A (⊆ [m]) from the item
database as ads. To make a recommendation to a user, with probability γ, independent of
everything else, it chooses an item that has not been shown from the ad-pool, A. And with
probability 1 − γ, it can follow any recommendation algorithm (for example, an objective
recommendation algorithm). We refer to γ as the bias probability. Note that the strategy for
showing ad items is unspecified except that no item is shown to a user twice. In particular,
the engine may even customize its ad recommendations according to users’ tastes. As in the
case of the complete database, let fu(η,A) denote the number of effective ads in the ad-pool,
A for user, u.
2.3 Discussion of Assumptions
Some of the assumptions in the recommender system model above are present only for ease
of analysis. We discuss below how they can be relaxed in practical settings.
1. It is assumed that, in any recommendation engine, an item once recommended to a
user is not recommended to the same user again. This condition is required only to
ensure that there are no repeated recommendations of sponsored advertisements that
might be effective. Indeed, if all sponsored ad recommendations are effective, it would
not be possible to distinguish them from genuine recommendations. This assumption
can therefore be relaxed to require sufficient number of ineffective ad recommendations
in a biased recommender system.
2. The noise in estimation of the user-item rating matrix is assumed to be additive i.i.d.
noise. This can be replaced by a more general noise model in which the elements of
the estimated user-item matrix are independent across users, items and time. The
independence assumption is used to model arbitrary errors which are unlikely to skew
the estimated matrix in such a way as to give high preference to a small number of
ineffective items uniformly across a large subset of users.
3. We assume that a biased recommendation engine decides to show sponsored ads with
probability γ (bias probability) independent of everything else. This assumption, again,
is used only for ease of exposition. It is sufficient to have arbitrary γ fraction of the
recommendations from the ad-pool, not necessarily chosen at random.
3 Anomaly Detection Algorithm and Theoretical Re-
sults
In this section, we describe the algorithm for detecting anomalous systems and provide
analysis of Type I and Type II errors as in binary hypothesis testing.
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3.1 Anomaly Detection System
The problem is to design a test to detect if a recommendation engine is biased. In other
words, the test has to decide between the following two hypotheses:
• H1 : “The recommendation engine is biased,” and
• H0 : “The recommendation engine is not biased.”
It is similar to a hypothesis testing problem except that the statistical distribution for the
two hypotheses are not well defined. The only a priori knowledge that is assumed is the
structure of a biased recommendation engine as specified in Section 2.2. But the specifics
of various parameters in the recommendation engine, such as bias probability γ and the ad-
pool A is unknown. As in traditional hypothesis testing problems, we make use of multiple
data points obtained from many users who constitute the anomaly detection system. The
anomaly detection system consists of a set of n players which is a subset of the user database
in the recommendation system. These players can give accurate binary feedback (effective
or ineffective) on the items recommended to them. Without loss of generality, we denote
these players as users indexed from 1 to n in the user database.
3.2 Algorithm
We now describe an algorithm called Binary feedback Anomaly Detector (BiAD), that uses
the recommendations made to the players and their feedback to decide between one of the
two hypotheses. In every round of recommendation, each player is recommended an item by
the recommendation engine. In round t, the algorithm uses the feedback from the players
and computes for each item, the total number of players until that round who have been
recommended that item and found the item ineffective. This number is denoted by Bi(t) for
item i. If the sum of the largest Aˆ(t) of these numbers among all the items is greater than or
equal to a threshold T (t), the recommendation engine is declared to be biased. Otherwise, the
same procedure is repeated in the next round. If the algorithm does not declare the engine
to be biased in Q(m) rounds, then the hypothesis that the engine is biased is rejected.
Here, Aˆ(t), T (t) and Q(m) in the algorithm are appropriately designed parameters (given
by Equations 1-7). The pseudocode for this algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
As opposed to the basic average test, this algorithm searches for concentration of large
number of ineffective items in a small set. Since the number of potential advertisements is
unknown, this algorithm makes decisions in real-time as it gets feedback from the players.
Larger the size of the ad-pool, larger is the number of feedback samples required to detect a
biased engine. (The trade off between various parameters is discussed in detail in Section 4.)
Therefore, the algorithm increases the size of the search set with progressing rounds of
recommendation. Also, note that the algorithm requires only binary feedback from the
players – whether the recommendations are effective or ineffective, which explains the name
of the algorithm.
The following theorem gives sufficient conditions for good performance of the algorithm.
Unlike in general hypothesis testing problems, we define Type I error, which corresponds to
false positives, only for objective systems. On the other hand, Type II error is used to refer
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Algorithm 1 Binary feedback Anomaly Detector (BiAD)
Initialize t = 1 (round 1).
while t ≤ Q(m) do
Compute Bi(t) = number of players who have rated item i ineffective upto round t for
all i ∈ [m].
Compute S(t) = sum of the largest Aˆ(t) among {Bi(t)}mi=1 .
if S(t) ≥ T (t) then
Stop and accept H1.
else
t← t + 1.
end if
end while
Stop and reject H1.
to missed detection in the case of a biased system. We do not give any guarantees for the
class of recommendation engines that are neither objective nor biased.
Theorem 1. Let the parameters in the detection algorithm, BiAD satisfy the following equa-
tions:
Aˆ(t) = t, (1)
T (t) = exp
(
1 +W
(
βˆ(t)
e
))
pˆ(t), (2)
where W (·)1 represents the Lambert-W or product log function, and
βˆ(t) =
(
Aˆ(t) + c
)
logm
pˆ(t)
− 1, (3)
pˆ(t) = exp
(
1 +W
(
β(t)
e
))
p(t), (4)
β(t) =
(
Aˆ(t) + c
)
logm
p(t)
− 1, (5)
p(t) = max
{Aˆ⊆[m]:|Aˆ|=Aˆ(t)}
{
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
E
[
P Aˆu (l)
]}
, (6)
P Aˆu (l) =
∑
i∈Aˆ
1 {Rui < η}
F
(
Rˆui(l), Rˆu(l)
)
− l + 1
, (7)
with c = 1/2. Then BiAD gives the following guarantees on the error probabilities:
(I) Type I Error:
If the recommendation engine is objective, the probability that BiAD declares it to be
anomalous is O(Q(m)√
m
).
1For any z ∈ R, W (z)eW (z) = z.
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(II) Type II Error:
If the recommendation engine is anomalous with an ad-pool of size A, and if
(a) the number of ads, A ≤ Q(m),
(b) the fraction of recommendations that are ads, i.e., the bias probability γ = ω
(
logm
n
)
, ω(p(A)
nA
),
and
(c)
∑n
u=1 fu(η,A) = o(γnA), where fu(η,A) is the number of effective ads for user
u,
then the probability that BiAD does not declare the system as anomalous within A
rounds is e−Ω(γn).
The proof of this theorem is presented in Section 6.
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how the error probabilities depend on the parameters of the
problem.
4.1 Choice of Threshold
Note that computation of the threshold function, T (t) as specified in Theorem 1 (given
by Equation (2)) requires knowledge of the noise statistics and also the players’ opinions
about all the items in the database. More precisely, since Rˆ(t) = R + ǫ(t), computation
of E
[
P Aˆu (l)
]
(see Equation (7)) requires knowledge of Ru and also the distribution of es-
timation noise, ǫu(l). The noise statistics reflect the accuracy of the learning strategy of
the recommendation engine, and it is possible that these statistics are unknown or cannot
be estimated. Moreover, it might also be difficult to obtain the players’ opinions about all
the items in the database. To overcome this difficulty, a practical implementation of the
algorithm could use an approximation of the unknown quantity. We now propose one way
to compute such an approximation. Note that
E
[
P Aˆu (l)
]
= E

∑
i∈Aˆ
1 {Rui < η}
F
(
Rˆui(l), Rˆu(l)
)
− l + 1


≤ E

∑
i∈Aˆ
1
F
(
η + ǫui(l),Ru(l) + ǫu(l)
)
− l + 1

 ,
where the inequality follows since F
(
r,Ru(l) + ǫu(l)
)
is a non-increasing function of r. We
assume that the estimates of the ratings are not skewed in one direction, and therefore the
noise has zero mean. Since the noise statistics are unknown, we could approximate the right
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hand side of the above inequality by substituting the noise term with its mean. With this
approximation, the right hand side of the inequality can be substituted with
∑
i∈Aˆ
1
F
(
η,Ru(l)
)
− l + 1
=
Aˆ(t)
fu(η, [m])− l + 1 , (8)
where fu(η, [m]) is the total number of effective items in the database for user u. Depending
on the application, it might be relatively easy to estimate this number or at least estimate
a lower bound for this number. As an example, one could roughly estimate that for every
user there are
√
m effective items among the m items in the database. We observe in our
simulations that a rough estimate of fu(η, [m]) is sufficient to obtain good results.
Note that over-estimation (under-estimation) of T (t) decreases the probability of Type
I (Type II) error and increases the probability of Type II (Type I) error. In other words,
the higher the value of T (t), the lower is the probability of Type I error and the higher
is the probability of Type II error. Therefore, the risk associated with false positives and
missed detection could serve as a guideline for the choice of the threshold function. In our
simulations (Section 5), we propose a practical threshold function that gives a good balance
between the two error probabilities for most scenarios.
4.2 Effect of Parameters on Performance
Theorem 1 gives guarantees on the asymptotic performance of BiAD as the size of the
database grows large. These guarantees depend on various parameters in the algorithm as
well as the recommendation engine. From the analytic bounds derived in Theorem 1, we
analyze in this section the trade off between these parameters to understand the conditions
under which the algorithm shows good performance. We see that the theoretical results
support our intuitive understanding about the conditions under which a biased system can be
distinguished from an objective system. These results are also corroborated by our simulation
results described in Section 5.
In Section 4.1, we consider the effect of the choice of the threshold parameter on the error
probabilities. We now discuss the effect of other parameters.
Number of Rounds in the Test and Size of the Ad-Pool. It is seen (from Result (I))
that the upper bound on the probability of Type I error increases with increasing number
of rounds. This is expected, since it gives more chances to falsely declare a system biased.
For Type I error to go to zero as the size of the database goes to infinity, it is sufficient if
Q(m) = o(
√
m).
Guarantees for detection of a biased engine (Result (II)) are dependent on various pa-
rameters. One of the conditions is that the ad-pool is not very large (Condition (II)a).
Specifically, it is sufficient if the size of the ad-pool, A is at most the maximum number
of rounds of recommendations, Q(m). Therefore, increasing Q(m) (the number of rounds
of testing) enables detection of larger ad-pools but also increases the probability of Type
I error. Intuitively, a small ad-pool conforms with our definition of a biased recommenda-
tion engine as one that favors a few items over many others and therefore facilitates easier
detection.
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Number of Effective Ads. For correct detection of a biased engine, it is also required
that the average number of effective ads (averaged over all players) is not very large (Condi-
tion (II)c). A large number of effective ads enables the recommendation system to customize
ads according to users’ tastes and is contradictory to our interpretation of a biased system
which recommends ads that do not match with users’ preferences.
Number of Players. The dependence on the number of players n is seen in two respects – it
determines the minimum bias probability at which detection is guaranteed (Condition (II)b)
and also the probability of Type II error. Both these results show that a large number of
players improves the prospect of correct identification which can explained by the fact that
a large sample size supports better statistical analysis.
Number of Effective Items. The minimum bias probability at which detection is ensured
is also determined by the average number of effective items in the entire database. This can
be seen from the term p(A)
nA
in (Condition (II)b). The no estimation noise case (ǫui(t) = 0
for all u, i, t) is useful in understanding the term p(A)
nA
. When there is no noise, p(A)
nA
=
O
(
1
nA
∑n
u=1
∑A
l=1
A
fu(η,[m])−l+1
)
. Therefore, p(A)
nA
has an inverse relation with the number
of effective items in the database. This conveys that a large number of effective items
facilitates better detection of a biased engine. Intuitively, a large number of effective items
in the database helps in clearer demarcation of an objective engine from a biased one. With
many effective items in the database, an objective system would have a higher probability of
recommending effective items, while a biased system always makes at least γ fraction of its
recommendations from the ad pool where the number of effective ads is limited.
Bias Probability. The more a biased engine recommends from the ad-pool, the more
apparent is its biased behavior. The fraction of total recommendations that are from the
ad-pool is captured by the bias probability, γ. We see that the probability of Type II error
decays exponentially with increasing γ, and also that larger γ facilitates easier anomaly
detection (Conditions (II)b, (II)c).
Choice of c = 1/2. In the course of the proof of Theorem 1, we prove that for any
choice of c, the Type I Error is bounded by O(Q(m)m−c ). Hence, by changing c in the
algorithm, one can control the error probability. However, the downside of increasing c is
that it effectively increases the threshold T (t), which results in requiring the bias probability
γ = ω(logm(1 + (c/A))/n).
4.3 Applications
The proposed anomaly detection algorithm is readily applicable in the retail market. It
can identify recommender systems that dole out sponsored advertisements in the garb of
personalized recommendations. In this era of personalization, there are numerous other
applications, two of which are described below. These two examples also illustrate the
advantage of BiAD in requiring simple binary feedback, allowing it to be applied in a wide
variety of scenarios.
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Search Engine Bias. Search engine bias is one of the most important ethical issues sur-
rounding search engines, and its social implications have been studied for more than a decade
[4, 15, 5]. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [16] describes search engine bias as non-
neutrality of search engines, where “search algorithms do not use objective criteria” or “favor
some values/sites over others in generating their list of results for search queries.” A spon-
sored search engine in the late 1990s called GoTo ranked its search results purely based
on bids from advertisers [17]. It was evidently unsuccessful due to users’ mistrust of paid
searches and was eventually acquired by Google. Google also uses an auction to sell ads but
displays them physically separated from organic search results.
The pros and cons of enforcing transparency in the algorithms used for generating search
results have been examined in [17, 18]. Even in the absence of total transparency, anomaly
detection systems such as BiAD could be useful in identifying bias in search engines. With
personalization being extended to search results [19, 20, 21], search engines virtually act
as recommendation engines. With large number of potential search results, our model of
recommender systems with a large database fits well in this problem where biased search
engines correspond to biased recommender systems. In addition to search engines, this
example can be extended to identify hidden sponsored advertisements in social networking
sites and online news portals, all of which use personalization algorithms.
Pharmaceutical Lobby. Pharmaceutical lobbying is another controversial issue that af-
fects many parts of the world [22, 23, 24, 25]. Among its many aspects, we focus on the
marketing practices of large pharmaceutical companies which manipulate the opinions of
doctors, health care providers and law-makers by providing biased information and through
other tactics [26, 27]. There have been allegations that big drug companies influence physi-
cians to prescribe their highly priced branded drugs even when other better or cheaper
alternatives are available [28, 29].
Again, our interpretation of a biased recommendation engine is well-suited to model this
scenario. Since drugs are prescribed on a person-to-person basis, health care providers can
be viewed as recommendation service providers who recommend drugs to patients, and the
lobbying drug companies act as advertisers. A health care system that favors a few incom-
petent (expensive or ineffective) drugs in spite of the availability of other better (cheaper
or more effective) alternatives matches well with our definition of a biased recommenda-
tion engine. With data samples consisting of prescriptions and their efficacy on patients,
anomaly detection algorithms like BiAD could help watchdog agencies in identifying such
malpractices.
5 Numerical Results
We evaluate our algorithm through offline simulations, with careful considerations for ensur-
ing proximity to real world scenarios.
5.1 Simulation Setup
Given below is a detailed description of the methods we adopt in our simulations to replicate
the different components of a recommender system.
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User-Item Database. Estimating users’ opinions about all items in a database is essential
for real-world recommender systems, and hence for simulating those recommender systems
as well. However, the ground truth on such data set is not available, since in existing data
sets each user typically only rates a small subset of items, and those ratings are also noisy
and possibly biased.
For a complete user-item rating matrix, we take available sparse data sets ([30, 31, 32])
and renormalize the ratings on a linear scale from zero to ten. The missing entries in the
sparse matrix are then filled in using the matrix completion algorithm from [33]. For the
purpose of simulating real-world user opinions, we consider this completed matrix as ground
truth. We evaluate our algorithm on three data sets:
D1 a subset of the Amazon cellphones and accessories data set [30] with 3671 users and
8728 items,
D2 a subset of the Netflix Prize data set [31] with 2951 users and 9259 movies, and
D3 a subset of the Movielens 10m ratings data set [32] with 3671 users and 8729 movies.
Recommendation Engine. Due to non-transparency of recommendation strategies, it is
not exactly known how recommendation engines behave. As a representation of the learning
strategies used by these systems, we use two learning algorithms popular in literature:
L1 Matrix factorization. Specifically, we use the inexact ALM method proposed in [34].
L2 User-based collaborative filtering (with Pearson correlation as the similarity metric
[35]).
To simulate the temporal dynamics of a recommender system, the recommendation engine
is initially supplied a sparse subset of the user-item ratings chosen according to a power-
law degree distribution observed in real-world data sets [36]. (Specifically, the number of
feedback entries from each user is chosen from a pareto(3, 3) distribution.) In each round of
recommendation, the engine recommends one item to each user and observes users’ feedback
about the recommended items. It periodically updates its estimate of the users’ preferences
based on this feedback. In our experiments, we set the frequency of these updates to once
in every 5 rounds.
It is natural for a recommendation engine to have an explore component to address
the cold start problem and have wider coverage of the database [37]. Therefore, in all our
experiments we invoke random explore for 0.1 fraction of the recommendations made. In
a recommendation meant for exploration, an item is chosen uniformly at random from the
database, provided it has not been shown previously.
For all other recommendations which do not explore, we use the following recommenda-
tion strategy – for each user, the items are ranked according to the estimated preferences. To
make a recommendation, an objective recommendation engine chooses the highest ranked
item among the items not yet recommended. The recommendation strategy of a biased
engine follows the description in Section 2.2.2 – for any recommendation, with probability
1− γ, like an objective engine, it recommends the highest ranked item and with probability
γ, it recommends an item from the ad-pool. We consider two kinds of ad selection strategies
– from the among the ads that have not already been recommended to the user,
A1 An ad item is chosen uniformly at random.
A2 The ad item which has the highest ranking is chosen.
Strategy A2 corresponds to customization of ads according to users’ tastes. Note that this
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is harder to detect than strategy A1 since it has higher likelihood of recommending effective
ads.
Anomaly Detection System. For players in the anomaly detection system, we randomly
choose a subset of users from the data set. In experiments which test the performance of the
algorithm with increasing number of players, we choose the subset of players incrementally.
As explained in Sections 2 and 3, the algorithm requires feedback samples of efficacy of the
recommendations made to the players. For our experiments, we adopt the characterization
of efficacy used in our theoretical model given by Definition 1. Note that the number of
effective items in the database for any user depends on the efficacy threshold η. To be able
to test the algorithm for different number of effective items, we choose a different efficacy
threshold for each of the data sets. Specifically, we set η = 5.5, 8.0, and 8.8 for data sets D1,
D2, and D3, which correspond to an average number of effective items of 80, 250, and 150
respectively.
5.2 Results
We evaluate the performance of BiAD with variations in different parameters of the rec-
ommender system and the anomaly detection system. To demonstrate its effectiveness in
different settings, we present performance results for various combinations of data sets (D1-
D3) and recommendation algorithms (L1-L2, A1-A2). An objective recommendation engine
is represented by its learning algorithm (L1 or L2) while a biased recommendation engine
is represented by its learning algorithm (L1 or L2) and its ad-recommendation strategy (A1
or A2). Although we present experimental results for specific combinations for space limita-
tions, other settings give similar trade offs. Specifically, the simulation results corroborate
our theoretical analysis of the tradeoffs between various parameters in Section 4.
We now describe how the performance depends on the choice of various parameters in
BiAD. We set the parameter Aˆ(t) according to Equation (1) in all the simulations. Other
parameters of the algorithm are discussed below.
Threshold. As explained in Section 4.1, varying the threshold parameter T (t) in the algo-
rithm affects Type I and Type II error probabilities in opposite ways. Using lower values
of threshold increases probability of Type I error and decreases that of Type II error. The
threshold given by Equation (2) is designed to ensure, irrespective of the number of players
in the anomaly detection system, low probability of false positive (Type I error) even when
the estimated user preferences are noisy. This is especially important if the risk associated
with false implication of an objective recommendation engine is high.
We observe that a less conservative threshold gives a better balance between the two types
of errors. Specifically, we use a threshold that can be proved to guarantee low error rates
under the assumption that the recommendation engine’s estimation of user preferences are
accurate. This threshold, denoted by T ′(t), is equal to the value of pˆ(t) given by Equation (4).
In all our simulations, we show the performance of BiAD for both these threshold choices.
Simulation results show that T ′(t) gives better performance than T (t) except in one case
(Figure. 2b) where those two choices give similar performances.
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(a) Data set : D1 , Algorithm : L2 + A1 ,
n = 100, γ = 0.45, A = 8.
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(b) Data set : D2 , Algorithm : L2 + A2 ,
n = 100, γ = 0.35, A = 8.
Figure 1: Number of rounds in the test, Q(m) affects the number of ads that can be detected
at least 8 and 15 rounds required for T ′(t) and T (t) respectively.
In both these thresholds, E[P Aˆu (l)] in Equation (6) is substituted with the right hand
side of (8). This requires knowledge of the number of effective items for each player in the
anomaly detection system. In our simulations, BiAD approximates this with the average
number of effective items for all the users. Effectively, it uses the following value of p(t)
instead of Equation (6):
p(t) =
t∑
l=1
nAˆ(t)
f˜([m])− l + 1 , (9)
where f˜([m]) is an estimate of the average number of effective items in the database [m].
We assume that this average number is not very difficult to estimate and in all the results,
unless specified, BiAD has an accurate estimate of this number.
Number of Rounds in the Test. The number of rounds of recommendation Q(m) affects
the error probability. This is seen in Figure 1 which shows the variation of sum of Type I
and Type II errors with Q(m). Type I error rate is in fact close to zero for all values of
Q(m) for both the thresholds, so the plots effectively show Type II error rates. Theorem 1
guarantees detection of a biased engine if Q(m) ≥ A. The plots show that BiAD detects
8 ads if Q(m) is at least 8 and 15 for T ′(t) and T (t) respectively. For all the remaining
simulations, we set the parameter Q(m) = 40.
Number of Players. Larger number of players in the anomaly detection system indicates
higher number of input samples to the algorithm, and as expected, the algorithm performs
better as this number increases. In Figure 2, we plot the sum of Type I and Type II error
rates with increasing number of users. To detect a biased engine with the specified value of
γ, these plots show that 70 and 100 players respectively are sufficient when T ′(t) and T (t)
are chosen to be the threshold parameter. We use 100 players in all other simulations.
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(a) Data set : D1, Algorithm : L1 + A1,
A = 8, γ = 0.45.
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(b) Data set : D2, Algorithm : L1 + A1 ,
A = 8, γ = 0.35.
Figure 2: The performance improves with number of collaborating users n.
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Figure 3: Variation of Type I + Type II error rates with size of data set. Data set : D2,
Algorithm : L1 + A2, A = 8, γ = 0.35, n = 100.. When there are more choices to recommend,
the user satisfaction with objective recommender systems improves making detection easier.
In addition to the choice of parameters in the algorithm, various aspects of the recom-
mender system affect the performance of BiAD. These are described below.
Size of the Database. Theorem 1 shows that BiAD performs well for recommender systems
with large item databases. Databases of varying size are constructed by sub-sampling items
from the original data set. Figure 3 shows the variation of Type I and Type II errors with
the size of the database. T (t) and T ′(t) have very similar performance for the parameters
in this experiment. The plot shows that, for detection of 8 ads recommended 35 percent of
the time, the algorithm is effective for databases of size 1500 items or larger.
We now demonstrate that BiAD has been appropriately designed to identify biased en-
gines that systematically recommend (make a sizable fraction of recommendations) from a
small ad-pool.
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(b) Data set : D2 , Algorithm : L2 + A2 ,
n = 100, γ = 0.35.
Figure 4: As the size of the ad-pool A increases, the (personalized) ads become similar to
effective recommendations, making it hard to detect (Type II error is large).
Size of the Ad-Pool. Theorem 1 shows that BiAD guarantees detection of a biased engine
that has a small ad-pool. This same effect is also observed in simulations – Figure 4 shows
rate of missed detection (Type II error rate) with varying size of the ad-pool. It is seen that
both the thresholds perform well for small number of ads, while threshold T ′(t) can detect
an ad-pool of size upto 25.
Bias Probability. The bias probability γ quantifies the intensity of bias of the recommen-
dation engine. Plots (Figure 5) for Type II error rate with γ show that more biased (higher
γ) engines are easier to detect.
Estimate of the Number of Effective Items. In all the simulations above, it is assumed
that BiAD has an accurate estimate of the average number of effective items (f˜([m])) which
is used to determine the threshold parameter in the algorithm (See Equation (9)). Note
that overestimation of this parameter lowers the threshold parameter thereby increasing the
probability of Type I error and decreasing the probability of Type II error. Figure 6 shows
the effect of variations in this estimate for data set D3 which has an average of 150 effective
items. We observe that T ′(t) performs well for a wide range of estimates. In the case of
T (t), it is safer to overestimate the parameter f˜([m]) than to underestimate it.
5.3 Ineffectiveness of Basic Average Test
As explained in the introduction (Section 1), we demonstrate the inability of the basic
average test to distinguish between random errors and deliberate promotion of ads. This
test computes the average rating across all recommendations and decides between the two
hypotheses based on a threshold parameter. With the specifics of the recommendation
strategy (explore probability) unknown, it is difficult to estimate the right value of threshold.
For an explore probability of 0.1, Figure 7 shows the performance of the basic average test
for different values of the threshold, denoted τ. It is seen that threshold values around 3 give
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Figure 5: Type II error rate decreases as bias probability γ increases.
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Figure 6: Variation of Type I + Type II error rates with perturbations in the algorithm’s
estimate of the average number of effective items f˜([m]). Data set : D3, Algorithm : L1 +
A1, A = 8, γ = 0.4, n = 100.
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Figure 8: Variation of Type I error rates with variation in explore probability shows that
the threshold for the basic average test is sensitive the value of explore probability. Data set
: D1, Algorithm : L1, n = 100.
the best performance. But, as shown in Figure 8, this same threshold value fails for other
values of explore probability. For example, the basic average test falsely declares an objective
recommendation engine with 20 percent explore probability as biased. This shows that the
correct choice of τ is sensitive to the explore probability. In contrast, note that BiAD has
nearly zero Type I error rate for all values of explore probabilities.
6 Proofs
Before we provide the proof of the main theorem, we state and prove two lemmas used in
proving the main theorem.
Lemma 2. For any objective recommendation algorithm and for any user u, item i, and
time t < (F (Rˆui(t), Rˆu(t)) + 1), the probability that item i is recommended to user u at time
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t is upper bounded by
Wui(t) ≤ 1
F
(
Rˆui(t), Rˆu(t)
)
− t+ 1
. (10)
Proof.
1
(a)
=
m∑
j=1
Wuj(t)
≥
m∑
j=1
1
{
Rˆuj(t) ≥ Rˆui(t)
}(
1−
t−1∑
l=1
1ui(l)
)
Wuj(t)
(b)
≥
m∑
j=1
1
{
Rˆuj(t) ≥ Rˆui(t)
}(
1−
t−1∑
l=1
1ui(l)
)
Wui(t)
=
∣∣∣∣∣
{
j : Rˆuj(t) ≥ Rˆui(t),
t−1∑
l=1
1uj(l) = 0
}∣∣∣∣∣Wui(t)
≥
(∣∣∣{j : Rˆuj(t) ≥ Rˆui(t)}∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣
{
j :
t−1∑
l=1
1uj(l) 6= 0
}∣∣∣∣∣
)
Wui(t)
=
(
F
(
Rˆui(t), Rˆu(t)
)
− (t− 1)
)
Wui(t),
where the (a) and (b) follow from the characterization of an objective recommendation al-
gorithm in Section 2.2.1 – equality (a) due to the fact that W(t) is a stochastic matrix
(Property 1), and inequality (b) due to the monotonic property satisfied by the weight matrix
(Property 3). The above inequality gives the desired bound in (10) for t < (F (Rˆui(t), Rˆu(t))+
1).
Lemma 3. Let {Xi, i = 1, . . . , k} be independent Bernoulli random variables with mean
{pi, i = 1, . . . , k}, and let
∑k
i=1 pi ≤ p. Then,
P
[
k∑
i=1
Xi ≥ T
]
≤ exp
(
−T log
(
T
p
)
+ T − p
)
∀T > p.
Using Chernoff bound for independent random variables, we have, for any θ > 0,
P
[
k∑
i=1
Xi ≥ T
]
≤ e−θT
k∏
i=1
E
[
eθXi
]
= e−θT
k∏
i=1
(
pie
θ + 1− pi
)
≤ e−θT
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
(
pie
θ + 1− pi
))k
≤ e−θT
(p
k
(
eθ − 1)+ 1)k ,
20
where the second inequality follows from the fact that the geometric mean of non-negative
numbers is at most their arithmetic mean, and the last inequality follows for θ > 0, which is
true for the choice of θ = log ((k − p)T/(p(k − T ))) for any T > p. Then, we get
P
[
k∑
i=1
Xi ≥ T
]
≤
(
p(k − T )
(k − p)T
)T (
(k − p)T
(k − T )k + 1−
p
k
)k
=
( p
T
)T ( k − p
k − T
)k−T
=
( p
T
)T (
1 +
T − p
k − T
)k−T
≤
( p
T
)T
eT−p
= exp
(
−T log
(
T
p
)
+ T − p
)
.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of the theorem consists of two parts which give upper bounds
for probability of Type I and Type II errors.
Type I Error
The algorithm makes a Type I error if it declares an objective recommendation engine to be
biased. This section shows that the probability that the algorithm makes Type I Error is
low.
Suppose that the recommendation engine uses an objective recommendation algorithm.
We first bound the probability that BiAD accepts H1 in round t. Recall that the algorithm
accepts H1 in round t if S(t) ≥ T (t), and that
S(t) = max
{Aˆ⊆[m]:|Aˆ|=Aˆ(t)}
∑
i∈Aˆ
Bi(t).
Consider a fixed Aˆ ⊆ [m] such that |Aˆ| = Aˆ(t). We first bound the probability that∑
i∈AˆBi(t) ≥ T (t) and then use union bound over all possible Aˆ to obtain an upper bound
on the probability that S(t) ≥ T (t). In this direction, we define
Xu(l) :=
∑
i∈Aˆ
1ui(l) · 1 {Rui < η} . (11)
Note that Xu(l) is equal to 1 if in round l, player u is recommended some item from
set Aˆ that is not effective and is 0 otherwise. Given
{
W(l), Rˆ(l), l ∈ [t]
}
, we have that
{Xu(l), l ∈ [t], u ∈ [n]} are Bernoulli random variables independent of each other. For every
1 ≤ u ≤ n and 1 ≤ l ≤ t, the mean of Xu(l) can be bounded as follows:
E
[
Xu(l)
∣∣∣∣ {W(l′), Rˆ(l′)}t
l′=1
]
=
∑
i∈Aˆ
Wui(l)1 {Rui < η}
≤ P Aˆu (l), (12)
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where the inequality follows from the upper bound for Wui(l) from Lemma 2 and the defini-
tion of P Aˆu (l) ((7)). From (6), we have
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
E
[
P Aˆu (l)
]
≤ p(t).
Note that, since the noise in the rating estimates are independent across time and users,{
P Aˆu (l), l ∈ [t], u ∈ [n]
}
are independent random variables. We now use the Chernoff bound
in Lemma 3 to obtain a probabilistic upper bound on their sum.
P
[
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
P Aˆu (l) ≥ pˆ(t)
]
≤ exp
(
−pˆ(t)
(
log
(
pˆ(t)
p(t)
)
− 1
)
− p(t)
)
.
By the definition of Lambert-W function,
pˆ(t)
(
log
(
pˆ(t)
p(t)
)
− 1
)
=
(
Aˆ(t) + c
)
logm− p(t),
which further implies that
P
[
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
P Aˆu (l) ≥ pˆ(t)
]
≤ exp
(
−
(
Aˆ(t) + c
)
logm
)
. (13)
We now proceed to obtain a probabilistic upper bound for the sum,
∑n
u=1
∑t
l=1Xu(l).
By inequality (12), the sum of the corresponding means has the following upper bound:
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
E
[
Xu(l)
∣∣∣∣ {W(l′), Rˆ(l′)}t
l′=1
]
≤
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
P Aˆu (l).
Since {Xu(l), l ∈ [t], u ∈ [n]} are independent Bernoulli random variables given
{
W(l), Rˆ(l), l ∈ [t]
}
,
Lemma 3 can be used as before. If
∑n
u=1
∑t
l=1 P
Aˆ
u (l) ≤ pˆ(t), then Lemma 3 gives
P
[
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
Xu(l) ≥ T (t)
∣∣∣∣ {W(l′), Rˆ(l′)}t
l′=1
]
≤ exp
(
−
(
Aˆ(t) + c
)
logm
)
. (14)
The above upper bound can be derived in exactly the same manner as the upper bound in
(13). Combining this upper bound with inequality (13), we have
P
[
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
Xu(l) ≥ T (t)
]
≤ P
[
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
Xu(l) ≥ T (t)
∣∣∣∣
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
P Aˆu (l) ≤ pˆ(t)
]
+ P
[
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
P Aˆu (l) ≥ pˆ(t)
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−
(
Aˆ(t) + c
)
logm
)
. (15)
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Now, recall that Bi(t) is the number of players who have rated item i ineffective upto round
t, which can be mathematically written as Bi(t) =
∑n
u=1
∑t
l=1 1ui(l) · 1 {Rui < η} . Using
definition (11), we have ∑
i∈Aˆ
Bi(t) =
n∑
u=1
t∑
l=1
Xu(l),
which gives us the following equivalent form of inequality (15):
P

∑
i∈Aˆ
Bi(t) ≥ T (t)

 ≤ 2 exp(−(Aˆ(t) + c) logm) . (16)
We can now take a union bound over all possible Aˆ to bound the probability that BiAD
accepts H1 in round t.
P [S(t) ≥ T (t)] = P

 ⋃
{Aˆ⊆[m]:|Aˆ|=Aˆ(t)}


∑
i∈Aˆ
Bi(t) ≥ T (t)




≤
∑
{Aˆ⊆[m]:|Aˆ|=Aˆ(t)}
P

∑
i∈Aˆ
Bi(t) ≥ T (t)


≤ 2
(
m
Aˆ(t)
)
exp
(
−
(
Aˆ(t) + c
)
logm
)
≤ 2 exp (−c logm)
= 2m−c,
where the second inequality follows from (16). Further taking a union bound over all rounds,
P[Type I Error] = P
[
∪Q(m)t=1 S(t) ≥ T (t)
]
≤
Q(m)∑
t=1
P [S(t) ≥ T (t)]
≤ 2Q(m)m−c.
This shows that BiAD declares an objective recommendation engine as biased with proba-
bility O(Q(m)√
m
) for the choice of c = 1/2.
Type II Error
The algorithm makes a Type II error if it does not detect an biased recommendation engine,
i.e., it declares H0 when H1 is true. Suppose that the recommendation engine is biased with
an ad-pool A of size |A| = A. Fix a δ ∈ (0, 1). We prove that∑nu=1∑Al=1∑i∈A 1ui(l), which
is equal to the number of ad recommendations to the n players until round A is at least γ(1−
δ)nA with high probability. For any 1 ≤ u ≤ n, let Yu(l) = 1 if the biased recommendation
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engine decides to recommend from the ad-pool to user u in round t. Note that
∑
i∈A 1ui(l) ≥
Yu(l) and that {Yu(l), l ∈ [A], u ∈ [n]} are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with mean γ.
This gives us
P
[
n∑
u=1
A∑
l=1
∑
i∈A
1ui(l) < γ(1− δ)nA
]
≤ P
[
n∑
u=1
A∑
l=1
Yu(l) < γ(1− δ)nA
]
≤ e
(
− δ2γnA
2
)
, (17)
where the last inequality follows from a version of Chernoff bound given in [38] for sum of
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables.
The detection algorithm makes the correct decision if in round t, S(t) ≥ T (t) for some
t ≤ Q(m). We show that S(A) ≥ T (A) with high probability. Since A ≤ Q(m), the
algorithm makes the correct decision with high probability. Now, suppose that the number
of ad recommendations to the n players until round A is at least γ(1 − δ)nA. Since the
total number of effective ads to the n players is o(γnA), the total number of ineffective
recommendations from the ad-pool until round A is γΩ(nA). Consequently,
S(A) = max
{Aˆ⊆[m]:|Aˆ|=A}
∑
i∈Aˆ
Bi(t)
≥
∑
i∈A
Bi(t)
≥ γ(1− δ)nA− o(γnA)
= γΩ(nA). (18)
To prove that T (A) does not exceed the right hand side of inequality (18), we consider the
following cases:
(i): βˆ(A) ≥ e
Since W (·) is an increasing function in [0,∞), we have W
(
βˆ(A)
e
)
≥ W (1) > 1
2
. Now,
T (A) = exp
(
1 +W
(
βˆ(A)
e
))
pˆ(A)
=
βˆ(A)
W
(
βˆ(A)
e
) pˆ(A)
≤ (A+ c) logm
W (1)
=
logm
n
O(nA),
where the second equality follows from the definition of the Lambert W function, and
the last inequality follows by using the definition of βˆ(A) given by (3).
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(ii): βˆ(A) < e, β(A) ≥ e
pˆ(A) = exp
(
1 +W
(
β(A)
e
))
p(A)
=
β(A)
W
(
β(A)
e
)p(A)
≤ (A+ c) logm
W (1)
.
T (A) = exp
(
1 +W
(
βˆ(A)
e
))
pˆ(A)
≤ exp (1 +W (1)) pˆ(A)
=
logm
n
O(nA).
(iii): βˆ(A) < e, β(A) < e
T (A) = exp
(
1 +W
(
βˆ(A)
e
))
pˆ(A)
≤ exp (1 +W (1)) pˆ(A)
≤ exp (2 + 2W (1)) p(A)
=
p(A)
nA
O(nA).
Since γ = ω
(
logm
n
)
, ω(p(A)
nA
), combining the results from the above three cases with inequal-
ity (18) gives that S(A) ≥ T (A) for m large enough. Therefore, the algorithm declares the
correct hypothesis in round A if the number of ad recommendations to the n players until
round A is at least γ(1− δ)nA. We can therefore use the concentration inequality in (17) to
bound the probability of Type II error.
P[Type II Error] ≤ P [S(A) < T (A)]
≤ P
[
n∑
u=1
A∑
l=1
∑
i∈A
1ui(l) < γ(1− δ)nA
]
≤ exp
(
−δ
2
2
γnA
)
= e−Ω(γn).
This shows that the probability of Type II error decays exponentially with the number of
players and the bias probability.
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7 Conclusion
We propose an algorithm that can identify an biased recommendation engine that system-
atically favors a few sponsored advertisements over other genuine recommendations. We
formulate a probabilistic model for recommender systems and give theoretical guarantees for
our detection algorithm based on this model. Specifically, we show that the probability of
missed detection and false positives are low for recommender systems with large databases.
We show through simulations that the algorithm performs well for many data sets and
different types of recommendation algorithms. In an age when both personalization and
advertising have become very prevalent, this kind of anomaly detection algorithm is relevant
in a wide variety of scenarios. We demonstrate how our detection algorithm can be applied
to problems such as identification of search engine bias and pharmaceutical lobbying. It
would be interesting to investigate ways of deploying such an anomaly detection mechanism
in practical settings.
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